The Caracas Extraction 2026 AD

The UK's Hidden Role in Venezuelan Instability

Despite Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s insistence that the United Kingdom was not involved in the US operation on January 3, 2026, to extract Nicolás Maduro, the British government has faced scrutiny over its long-term support for regime change in the region.

By Nick Nutter on 2026-01-7 | Last Updated 2026-01-7 | The Caracas Extraction 2026 AD

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Nicolás Maduro Moros

The Official Response to the Extraction

Following the US military action, which critics argue violated UN statutes prohibiting force against sovereign states, the Prime Minister declined to issue a condemnation. “I want to get all the material facts together and we simply haven’t got the full picture at the moment”, Starmer told the BBC. He later elaborated on social media, stating that Britain “regarded Maduro as an illegitimate President and we shed no tears about the end of his regime”.

This cautious language stands in stark contrast to his reaction to the invasion of Ukraine, which he quickly termed a “war of aggression”. Former ambassador Sir Richard Dalton has described the current government stance as “cynical”, accusing it of failing to oppose “the law of the jungle”.

Military and Intelligence Ambiguity

While Starmer maintained there “was no UK involvement in this operation”, the reality on the ground appears more complex. Royal Navy personnel have been “embedded” within the US fleet surrounding Venezuela. Reports suggest that while Defence Secretary John Healey “ordered” these forces not to participate in strikes, and intelligence sharing was “reportedly” frozen in the Caribbean to avoid legal complicity, the UK military proximity to the event is undeniable.

Aligning with Trump in 2019

British support for destabilisation efforts dates back to 2019. Former foreign minister Alan Duncan’s diaries reveal that then-Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt sought to curry favour with the Trump administration. During a visit to Washington on 24 January 2019, Hunt attended a “mid-morning meeting with [US secretary of state] Mike Pompeo, and then Vice-President Mike Pence”.

It was during this session that Hunt surprised aides by “suddenly saying that we will consider recognising Guaidó”. According to Duncan, Hunt believed “we need to use Venezuela as an issue on which we can be as fully in line with the US as possible, because [Hunt] is out of line on a number of issues such as Syria”. Duncan described this as “one of those trade-off moments which we need if we are to handle the Trump administration cleverly”. Hunt reportedly justified the focus on Latin America by noting: “Venezuela is in their back yard, and it’s probably the only foreign adventure they might just pursue”.

Recognising Juan Guaidó

This diplomatic manoeuvre paved the way for the UK to join the US in recognising Juan Guaidó, a politician who had never run for presidential office. On 23 January 2019, Guaidó “swore” himself in as “interim president of Venezuela”, utilising Article 233 of the constitution to declare that Maduro had abandoned his post, leaving an “absolute vacuum of power”.

The UK formally recognised him shortly after, a move that Vanessa Neumann, Guaidó’s UK representative, linked to territorial concessions. She was recorded explaining that the “number one issue identified by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is that they won’t support us while we continue with the official line, that we want to take back the Essequibo from Guyana”. She consequently instructed her colleagues to “drop the topic” in exchange for British support.

Economic Interests and Financial Support

The recognition of Guaidó was the “key prerequisite” for the Bank of England’s decision to freeze $2 billion of Venezuelan gold. Former US National Security Adviser John Bolton remarked that Hunt was “delighted” to assist, “for example freezing Venezuelan gold deposits in the Bank of England”.

Duncan’s diaries detail how he provided Bank of England Governor Mark Carney with the necessary justification: “I tell Carney that I fully appreciate that, although it’s a decision for the Bank, he needs a measure of political air cover from us. I tell him I will write him the most robust letter I can get through the FCO lawyers, and it will outline the growing doubts over Maduro’s legitimacy and explain that many countries no longer consider him to be the country’s President”.

The UK government also invested heavily in the legal battle that ensued when Maduro sued for the gold’s release. The Foreign Office spent £80,697 of public funds specifically to promote Guaidó’s legal campaign in British courts. Furthermore, Guaidó’s own legal team incurred substantial costs; published accounts “suggesting Guaidó’s team spent over $8.5m on legal fees – roughly £7m”. Remarkably, these fees were “paid with money which was originally appropriated from the Venezuelan state in the US”, meaning American-seized assets were used to fund litigation in London.

The Secret Reconstruction Unit

Beyond legal battles, the UK government established a “Venezuela Reconstruction Unit” (VRU) in late 2019. “Located” within the Foreign Office, this unit was tasked with planning for a post-Maduro era. Documents show the unit’s head engaged in meetings regarding “UK involvement in the energy sector”, though full agendas remain classified for “national security reasons”.

Additionally, the Foreign Office “funded” an “anti-corruption” coalition in Venezuela to the tune of £450,000, drawing from the controversial Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. This occurred despite UN special rapporteur Alena Douhan having “noted” the negative humanitarian impact of the “repeated refusals of banks in the… United Kingdom… to release Venezuelan assets even for buying medicine, vaccines and protective kits”.

Internal communications suggest the sensitivity of these operations. Following journalistic exposures, embassy staff complained that “Articles on our programmes/operations here are particularly sensitive”. To this day, the Foreign Office refuses to fully disclose details, arguing that releasing information “would be likely to prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and [an]other state.”

Juan Guaidó's Downfall

The Collapse of the "Interim Government" (Dec 2022)
From 2019 to 2022, Guaidó was recognised by the US, UK, and nearly 60 other nations as the legitimate President of Venezuela. However, inside Venezuela, he held no actual power, he commanded no troops, controlled no territory, and could not collect taxes.

In December 2022, the Venezuelan opposition coalition (the Unitary Platform) turned on him. They argued that the "interim government" strategy had failed to dislodge Maduro and was only useful for managing foreign assets (like Citgo).

By a vote of 72 to 29, the opposition National Assembly voted to dissolve the interim government and remove Guaidó as its leader. They replaced him with a ceremonial leadership council (Dinorah Figuera) operating mostly from Spain, effectively ending the "dual presidency."

Guaidó Flees to the US (April 2023)
Stripped of his legal status and diplomatic immunity, Guaidó became vulnerable to arrest by Maduro’s security forces.

In April 2023, claiming he had received credible threats of imprisonment, Guaidó crossed the border into Colombia on foot. However, leftist Colombian President Gustavo Petro (who had restored ties with Maduro) refused to host him.

Guaidó was effectively pushed out to the United States. Since then, he has lived in Miami, lobbying Washington for continued sanctions but largely sidelined from the daily political struggle inside Venezuela.

How Maduro Regained Control
While Guaidó’s star faded, Maduro used a "survival strategy" to solidify his grip.

To stop the hyperinflation that was destroying his support, Maduro quietly allowed the US dollar to circulate. This stabilised the economy slightly and allowed a "bubble" of luxury consumption in Caracas, placating the business elite and military officers he needed to keep loyal.

Maduro successfully fractured the opposition by banning popular candidates (like María Corina Machado) from running in elections, forcing the opposition to constantly fight over who should replace them.

By 2023/2024, many countries (including neighbours like Brazil and Colombia, and eventually the EU) quietly dropped their recognition of the "interim government" and resumed diplomatic ties with Maduro, accepting the reality that he was the de facto ruler, regardless of legitimacy.

By the time of the US operation in January 2026, Juan Guaidó had been living in exile in Miami for nearly three years, having been ousted not by Maduro, but by his own opposition coalition.

Sources

Starmer Responds to Reports of U.S. Strikes and Maduro Capture”>

Declassified UK: How Britain helped Trump destabilise Venezuela

Declassified UK: Why is Venezuela’s gold still frozen in the Bank of England?